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The Mereology of Representation 
Jessica Leech. 
 
Abstract 
Mental representations ± like many other things ± seem to have parts. However, LWLVQ¶WFOHDU
how to properly understand the idea of a part of a representation. In this paper I shed new 
light on how representations can have a mereology. In particular, it has been recognized that 
WKHUHLVDPHUHRORJLFDOHOHPHQWWR.DQW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWZRNLQGVRIUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
intuitions and concepts. A concept depends upon its parts, whereas an intuition is prior to its 
parts. The paper thus focuses on an exploration of how to make sense of the parts and 
wholes of intuitions and concepts. 
I. Part and Wholes. It is natural to think of the world around us as containing whole 
things made up of, or decomposable into, their parts. Walls are made of bricks (and 
mortar). A human has body parts (head, shoulders, knees, toes etc.). We analyse 
sentences into their words. And so on.  
At least on the face of it, there are lots of different kinds of things, and so lots 
of different ways in which things can have parts. For example, the way in which a 
brick is part of a wall seems to be GLIIHUHQWWRWKHZD\LQZKLFK+DPOHW¶VµTo be or not 
to be¶ soliloquy is part of the play Hamlet. There are a host of questions one might 
then ask about different kinds of wholes and parts, and the different relationships 
between them. We might also question where to draw a line between genuine cases 
of a whole with parts, and cases where this is just a manner of speaking. For 
example, we might say that algebra is part of mathematics, but not take this too 
literally. The study of such questions is called µmereology¶.  
One important kind of mereological question concerns priority. Parts can be 
prior to their wholes (wholes depend upon their parts), or wholes can be prior to 
parts (parts depend upon the whole). Moreover, there are different senses of 
dependence. To give two examples: There might be existential dependence. For 
H[DPSOHDUJXDEO\DZDOOFRXOGQ¶WH[LVWZLWKRXWVRPHEULFNVEXWWKHEULFNVFRXOG
exist without being built into a wall. Or the dependence might concern the nature of 
the whole or part, such that the properties of one determine the properties of the 
other. )RUH[DPSOHWKHZDOO¶VEHLQJVROLGDQGURXJKVHHPVWRGHSHQGXSRQLWVEHLQJ
made of bricks that are solid and rough (compare: a wall made of marshmallows). 
Claims are often made about the part-whole (mereological) structure of mental 
representations.1 But prior to this kind of claim ± if this kind of claim is to be helpful or 
illuminating ± we must first ask ourselves: In what senses can mental 
representations have parts? The aim of this paper, broadly speaking, is to shed new 
light on how representations can have a mereology and to offer a new way to make 
sense of these mereological claims. ,VHHNDQDQVZHUWKDWGRHVQ¶WUHO\RQPHWDSKRU
For example, we might say that the concept unmarried is a part of the concept 
bachelor, but in what sense of part? To say, for example, that the former is 
µFRQWDLQHGLQ¶WKHODWWHULVQRWimmediately helpful: concepts are not straightforwardly 
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 %\µPHQWDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ¶,PHDQWRLQFOXGHDUDQJHRIPHQWDOVWDWHVHYHQWVDQGDFWLYLWLHVVXFKDV
thoughts, perceptions and concepts. 
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like Russian dolls. What we need is a substantive way to understand what certain 
representations are and then, in terms appropriate to this, how they have parts. It 
might turn out that such part-whole claims cannot, after all, be taken seriously, and 
that we should take claims about the parts of representations as just a misleading 
manner of speaking. I hope to show that there is a way to take at least some such 
claims literally. 
This is a broad question, so I shall narrow it by considering it from a particular 
SHUVSHFWLYHWKDWRI.DQW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQbetween two kinds of representation: intuitions 
and concepts. There are myriad issues concerning our understanding of this 
distinction, which I will not have space to consider here, or will only be able to 
examine briefly. My aim is to focus on the mereological aspect of this distinction: an 
intuition as a whole is prior to its parts, whilst a concept as a whole is posterior to its 
parts. The mereological nature of this distinction has been widely recognized (as, for 
example, by Aquila (1994), Bell (2001), Golob (2011), McLear (2015) and Wilson 
(1975)), but a question remains unanswered: how exactly should we understand the 
basis for this mereological distinction? Hence, my question is: in what sense can we 
understand a mental representation as having parts, so that these Kantian claims 
make sense, and are plausible? It will be a further question how my conclusions 
cohere with and support other interpretative and philosophical issues concerning 
concepts and intuitions. 
 The advertised aim of this paper is to provide a more secure foundation for 
mereological claims about representations. However, I also have an ulterior motive. 
,IVRPHWKLQJOLNH.DQW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQLQWXLWLRQs and concepts is true of our 
representations, then this could have significant ramifications. For example, 
elsewhere I argue that the purpose of modal judgments may be understood as 
arising from our having both intuitions and concepts as distinct kinds of 
representation (see Leech, 2014). This paper thus stands at the beginning of two 
wider research projects, one to provide a metaphysical basis for the mereology of 
representation, the other to explore the further philosophical consequences of 
mereological distinctions amongst our representations. 
I proceed as follows. First, I outline the Kantian background and the target 
distinction. Second, I outline where my paper touches on, and diverges from, 
debates concerning non-conceptual content. Third, I consider several ways in which 
we might take representations to have parts, and explain why they are not 
appropriate for understanding the mereological structure of intuitions. Finally, I 
introduce and motivate my preferred way to think of the nature of intuitions, which 
allows us to honour their mereological structure. My proposal depends upon thinking 
of intuitions as relations. 
II. Intuitions and Concepts. Kant famously distinguished between two kinds of 
representation: intuitions and concepts. Intuitions are singular and immediate, 
concepts general and mediate: 
[An intuition] is immediately related to the object and is singular; [a concept] is 
mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. 
(A320/B377) 
The role of intuitions is to present objects to the mind. 
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In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to 
objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all 
thought as a means is directed as an end, is intuition. (A19/B33) 
The role of concepts is to enable conceptual  thoughts about objects: for example, to 
describe, characterize and compare objects. Together, these two kinds of 
representations combine into what Kant calls a cognition. For Kant, both kinds of 
representation are required for cognition.  
Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. 
(A51/B75) 
We need intuitions to form a link between our thoughts and the world, but we also 
need concepts to be able to represent things as things, and not merely present them. 
 Is such a distinction defensible? The natural option would be to develop the 
definition of intuitions as singular and immediate representations. There is a sizable 
literature on such accounts, and their problems.2 Rather than rehearse these 
discussions, I am interested in considering a third option. Whilst Kant appears to 
define intuitions and concepts in terms of singularity/generality and 
immediacy/mediacy, when he argues that certain of our representations (those of 
space and time) are intuitions rather than concepts, he appeals to mereological 
features. That is, one can construe at least one key argument as running along the 
following broad lines.  
(1) Representation R has mereological feature M. 
(2) Concepts do not have feature M / Intuitions have feature M. 
(3) Therefore, R is an intuition and not a concept. 
 Kant writes: 
Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things 
in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only represent a single 
space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts 
of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were 
precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its 
composition would be possible), but rather are only thought in it. It is 
essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces 
in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it 
an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of them. 
(A24-26/B39) 
Here is my reconstruction of the argument. Kant describes some features of how we 
represent space. We can represent to ourselves only one space. So-called µdiverse 
spaces¶ are parts of one and the same unique space. Hence, our representation is 
singular. Moreover, as we represent space, the parts of space are not prior to the 
whole. Space is essentially just one, single thing: it is not a complex made up of 
parts. So the notion of a part of space is that of a limitation of the whole, not a 
component out of which the whole is composed. It is from these mereological 
claims²that we represent space as having parts only as limitations, and not as prior 
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components that compose to make the whole space²that Kant moves to his 
conclusion, that space (by which I read, our representation of space) is an intuition.3 
(By this point, Kant has already argued that our representation of space is pure²not 
derived from sense experience²and not empirical, hence his conclusion that our 
representation of space is an a priori or pure intuition.) Kant does allow, in this 
argument, that we can have a concept of space, or at least of VSDFHVµ«the general 
FRQFHSWRIVSDFHVLQJHQHUDOUHVWVPHUHO\RQOLPLWDWLRQV¶. But this is only because it 
is grounded in a more fundamental representation of space, an intuition. 
 The passage, and others like it, suggest the following two mereological 
principles: 
(i) The whole of an intuition is prior to its parts: the parts depend upon the whole. 
 
(ii) The parts of a concept are prior to the whole: the whole depends upon the 
parts. 
Several interesting questions can be raised, not least how these mereological 
features of intuitions relate to their other advertised features of singularity and 
immediacy. I will have more to say about this below, but first we need to understand 
the underlying claim that representations have parts. Representations are not like 
walls and human bodies, where it is relatively easy to look at them and read off their 
more obvious mereological features. We must do some more work.  
III. Mereology and Non-conceptual Content. Before moving on, I want to pause 
briefly to clarify which questions I am not going to address. My topic here is closely 
related to contemporary debates about non-conceptual content, namely, what is it 
like, and whether there is any. However, my interest lies slightly to one side of this.  
A significant aspect of the conceptualism/non-conceptualism debate focuses on 
representations of what we might call µpropositional size¶²thoughts and perceptions. 
For example: Can there be non-conceptual content in our thoughts? In our 
perceptions? Do we need any concepts at all for perception? One argumentative 
strategy exploits mereological differences between conceptual and non-conceptual 
content. For example, Fodor (2006) distinguishes between iconic and discursive 
representations in mereological terms. Discursive (roughly, conceptual) 
representations have logical form, and so have a canonical decomposition into their 
constituents, whereas iconic representations have no canonical decomposition²you 
can slice them as you like into arbitrary parts.  
Appeal is often made to the Generality Constraint. Evans writes, 
[I]f a subject can be credited with the thought that a is F, then he must have 
the conceptual resources for entertaining the thought that a is G, for every 
property of being G of which he has a conception. This is the condition that I 
call µThe Generality Constraint'. (Evans, 1982, 104) 
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 Kant does move on to the conclusion that space itself is nothing more than a form of intuition, but for 
present purposes it is clearer to keep the distinction between space and our representation of space 
intact. 
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The key thought is that conceptual representations²representations that have 
conceptual content²can be broken down into parts that are re-combinable in a 
particular way. 
 In these cases the question of structure is posed for something µbigger than¶ a 
concept or an intuition. A thought is decomposable and re-combinable in certain 
ways. A discursive representation has logical form, and so must be something of 
propositional shape, not one of the elements put together in that form. (By 
µSURSRVLWLRQDOVKDSH¶,PHDQWRFRYHUVHQWHQFHVVWDWHPHQWVSURSRVLWLRQVWKRXJKWV
etc.²anything that is or could be expressed using a grammatical declarative 
sentence.) It is clear that a distinction between representations of this µVL]H¶WKDWGR
and do not include conceptual content is reODWHGWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKLFKµVPDOOHU¶
representations are concepts and which, if any, are intuitions. But I wish to focus on 
the latter question. As such, I leave aside discussion of conceptualism versus non-
conceptualism.4  
Relatedly, a debate amongst readers of Kant is whether intuitions are able to 
play their role of presenting objects to the mind without the aid of concepts.5 Is the 
activity of the understanding²the faculty of concepts and judgments²already at 
work in sensibility, our faculty for having intuitions? This is more closely related to my 
concerns here. In looking for a mereological distinction between intuitions and 
concepts, I am assuming that there is a genuine difference, and that intuitions are 
not partly constituted  by some conceptual content. However, there may still be room 
for compatibility with both sides of the debate. One might agree with the 
conceptualiVWWKDWZLWKRXWWKHDFWLYLW\RIWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJLQWXLWLRQVGRQ¶WJLYHXV
very much, for example, they might present us with minimal content, but nothing as 
rich as perception of particulars. Nevertheless, there is still a minimal purely intuitive 
representation, and therefore still a distinction to be explored.  
IV. Different Parts. Returning to the core question: How can we make sense of a 
mental representation having parts?  
Can we think in terms of material or physical parts? No. It may be that 
representations have a physical realization, for example, a particular pattern of brain 
activity. But WKLVLVQ¶WWKHVHQVHLQZKLFK,¶P interested in the parts of a 
representation. ,¶PLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHOHYHODWZKLFKLWPDNHVVHQVHWR say, for 
example, that the concept unmarried is a part of the concept bachelor. It seems at 
least possible that the same mental representation could be physically realized in 
different ways, in different kinds of mind, or upon different occasions. However, this 
possibility does not seem to affect the structure at issue²that of the concept, say, 
regardless of how it is realized. Hence, it may be that there is a physical realization 
of these representations²with accompanying physical parts²but that is beside the 
point. 
We could simply say: representations are abstract entities, so they have 
abstract parts. But this, on its own, is not illuminating. In what sense do abstract 
entities have parts? We might imagine them on a model with physical parts. For 
                                                          
4
 There is of course another issue concerning how intuitions and concepts combine into thoughts, 
judgments and cognitions. I touch on this in Leech (2012), and Leech and Thomas (2013). 
5
 Recent contributions to this debate include Allais (2015), Golob (forthcoming), Land (2015a, 2015b) 
and McLear (forthcoming). 
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example, I can imagine the proposition that grass is green written out like a 
sentence, and see that the concept green is a part of it, insofar as I imagine the word 
µJUHHQ¶WREHSDUWRIWKHJKRVtly sentence. But this is just metaphorical. Or I can 
imagine an intuition as a snapshot of the world, and the parts of the intuition as being 
OLNHWKHSDUWVRIDSKRWRJUDSK%XWDJDLQDVWKHUHLVQ¶WUHDOO\DSKRWRJUDSKWKLVLV
just metaphorical. We need to say something more substantive about what an 
abstract object is like, and how it has parts. 
An example of an abstract object of which we have a relatively good 
understanding is a set.6 We might then think of the members of a set as parts of the 
set. Indeed, Fine writes 
There is a strong prima facie case in favour of taking the members of a set to 
be parts. For we do indeed talk of a set containing its members and of its 
being composed or built up out of its members; and, as I have suggested, 
such talk is not to be dismissed simply on the grounds that sets are not 
material things. (Fine 2010, 563)7 
According to the standard definition, the existence and identity of a set depend upon 
its members, so we can make sense of the whole set being existentially dependent 
upon its parts, its members. Could such an explanation be extended to 
representations? Perhaps there is scope to give an account of concepts as sets, for 
example, as functions from objects to truth-values (taking a function to be a set of 
ordered tuples). This would give us the correct mereological structure for concepts: 
the parts (members) being prior to the whole (set). 
Could a set-theoretic explanation help us to understand the nature and 
structure of intuitions? I do not think so. Primarily because, given the point just made, 
it would yield the wrong direction of dependence between the whole and parts of an 
intuition. Moreover, it is not clear how an intuition could be a set. In the case of 
concepts, we can recognise a that a concept is at least associated with a set of 
things falling under it²its extension. And we can recognise that functions can be 
WKRXJKWRIDVFRPSOH[VHWVDQGFRQFHSWVDVIXQFWLRQV%XWDQLQWXLWLRQ¶VUROHLVWR
present us with an object: it gives us the things which might be collected in the 
extension of a concept, or which might be arguments for the function. 
Another way to take representations to have parts is in terms of them 
representing things as having a part-whole structure. So, for example, we represent 
space as having parts only as limitations of the whole, and so therefore we take the 
representation of space itself to have this mereological structure. This option is 
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 Wilson (1975) gives an account of the differing part-whole structures of concepts and intuitions in 
terms of the former structure being akin to the set-theoretic notion of membership, and the latter 
having a PHUHRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUH+HUH,DPWDNLQJµPHUHRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUH¶WRUDQJHPRUHZLGHO\DQG
take different forms, whereas Wilson takes the notion more narrowly. However we take it, simply 
attributing mereological structure to intuitions does not help us to answer the present question of how 
to understand the nature of a representation so that it has that structure. 
7
 There is a complication. Strictly speaking, the membership relation is not a parthood relation, 
because membership is not transitive, whereas it is generally understood that parthood is. Fine 
suggests that the ancestral of the membership relation ± µZKHUHWKLVLVWKHUHODWLRQWKDWKROGVEHWZHHQ
x and y when x is a member of y or a member of a member of y or a member of a member of a 
member of yDQGVRRQ¶)LQH± is the parthood relation for sets. The members of a set are 
still parts, albeit its most direct parts. 
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SHUKDSVVXJJHVWHGE\.DQW¶VDUJXPHQWDERYHLQVRIDUDVKHVHHPVWRDSSHDOWRKRZ
we represent space as having parts. 
Such an option could be interpreted in two ways. First, representations have a 
mereological structure, but that structure is wholly derivative on how they represent 
things to be. Or second, representations in fact have no such structure, but we 
merely ascribe to them the structure that they represent things as having. In the first 
case, we retain the claim that representations genuinely have a mereological 
structure, but we need to say more about why we would expect that structure to be 
isomorphic to, or otherwise systematically similar to, the mereological structure of the 
object of representation. In the latter case, we would be giving up on the substantive 
mereological claim completely. It might even be appropriate to develop some kind of 
error theory, to explain why it is that we attribute mereological structure to items that 
in fact lack this structure. 
However we develop this option, a significant obstacle stands in its way. Our 
ambition is that mereology could be used to distinguish between intuitions and 
concepts, but this sense of part does not allow us to do so. We may be able to argue 
that intuitions represent things as having a µSULRUZKROH¶ structure. However, some 
representations that we would want to class as concepts also have this structure, in 
virtue of representing things as µSULRUZKROHV¶. For example, our concept of a human 
body represents a whole in terms of which we can understand its parts. We do not 
think of a body as being composed of its parts: bodies are not made from 
antecedently existing bones, organs, muscles, and so on. Rather, we think of the 
parts as growing alongside with, and discernible in the context of, the whole body. 
Perhaps more strikingly, even if Kant is right that our primary representation of space 
is intuitive, it is plausible to think that we still have a concept of space. That concept, 
if it represents space correctly, represents it as having parts only as a limitation of 
the whole. But that does not mean that our concept of space is an intuition. 
Rather than taking a representation to be a special kind of object, it may help 
to think in terms of an ability1RWHWKDW(YDQ¶V*HQHUDOLW\&RQVWUDLQWFRQFHUQed what 
a subject can do (recombine parts of thoughts). As Heck puts it,   
The ability to think that a is F must decompose into the abilities to think of a 
and to thLQNRIDWKLQJDV)DELOLWLHVWKDWDUHVXIILFLHQWO\GLVWLQFWWKDWRQH¶V
being able to think that a is F may be explained E\RQH¶VEHLQJDEOHWRWKLQNRI
a DQGRQH¶VEHLQJDEOHWRWKLQNRIDWKLQJDV)(Heck, 2007, p.9) 
Heck thus presents the view that the grasping of a concept, say, the concept horse, 
is an ability, say, the ability to think of a thing as a horse. Moreover, that ability 
partially explains other abilities, such as being able to think that Dobbin is a horse, or 
that horses are mammals.  
 The proposal is thus to think of representations as abilities, and the parts of 
representations as abilities that partially (note: part-ially) explain the whole ability. 
For example, one might take some parts of the concept bachelor to be the concepts 
unmarried and man. We can think of our ability to think of a thing as a man as 
partially explaining our ability to think of a thing as a bachelor. This looks like a 
promising account of the mereological structure of concepts. It is plausible that our 
more complex abilities depend for their existence and nature on simpler, constituent 
abilities. For example, just as my ability to think of a thing as a bachelor depends 
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upon my abilities to think of things as men and as unmarried, so one might take my 
ability to drive a car to be a complex made up of, and dependent upon, a range of 
other abilities, such as abilities to observe, press pedals, react quickly, and so on. 
This dependence relation is further suggested by the fact that we can diminish a 
more complex ability by removing one of its parts. For example, if my reaction times 
slow down significantly, my driving will suffer. Likewise, if my competency with the 
concept man is diminished, so one would expect my ability to think of things as 
bachelors to be similarly diminished. 
Can we apply the proposal to intuitions? What ability or capacity could an 
intuition be? The role of intuitions is to present us with objects, without which our 
thoughts could not get in touch with objects, so we might take an intuition of an 
object x to be the capacity to have thoughts about x. However, this would be to 
assume that any subject capable of having intuitions is also capable of thought. But it 
is plausible that something like sensible intuition is a capacity shared by humans and 
other animals, whereas only humans have the ability to also apply concepts to 
particulars and engage in conceptual thought (see Allais and Callanan, forthcoming). 
If we do not want to rule out the possibility of subjects that can have intuition but not 
conceptual thoughts, then we cannot define intuition in terms of a capacity to have 
thoughts. 
An intuition of x will come along with a range of other potential abilities, such 
as the ability to move around x, track it, sniff it, but none of these look like necessary 
conditions. It might be that an intuition of x always comes along with some such 
abilities, but it seems plausible there is no privileged ability or set of abilities that 
necessarily accompanies intuition. At least, this is probably an empirical question, 
that would rely on a prior understanding of what an intuition is, in order to test what 
abilities accompany it.8 Hence, I conclude that partial abilities might be a helpful way 
to think about the kinds of parts that concepts have, but not intuitions.  
Another approach which is amenable to concepts is to understand their parts 
in terms of inferential properties. Theories that associate concepts with some or 
other inferential abilities or relations are common.9 If such a view is otherwise 
defensible, we can think of the parts of a concept C as those concepts the 
satisfaction of which is implied by &¶V satisfaction, and/or as those concepts the joint 
satisfaction of which is sufficient to imply the satisfaction of C. For example, the 
satisfaction of a thing by man and unmarried is implied by its satisfying the concept 
bachelor, and if something satisfies both man and unmarried, then we can infer that 
it satisfies bachelor. 
Again, we have a conception of a representation and the way it can have 
parts that is amenable to thinking about concepts, but not intuitions. An intuition of a 
particular x does not, just on its own, license any inference. It may enable us to make 
inferences about x, for example, that if x is a bachelor, x is a man. But the intuition 
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something with the role to present the creature with objects²realized in a very different way. For 
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9
 A representative example is the view of Brandom. See his (1994; 2000; 2008; 2009). See also 
Landy (2015) for an inferentialist reading of Kant. 
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does not involve inferential connections between just itself and something else, 
unlike, say, the connection between the concepts bachelor and man. As above, we 
DOVRVKRXOGQ¶WWDNHan intuition of x to be an ability to make inferences about x, 
because we want to leave it open that beings without the capacity for logical 
reasoning could still have intuitions.  
In summary, I have considered several ways to understand a representation 
as having parts. Several seem promising as accounts of the way that concepts have 
parts. But I have argued that none so far is able to capture the sense in which an 
intuition has parts. In the next section, then, I propose one further way to think of 
intuitions that does better. 
V. Intuition and Presentation. When we ask how a representation has parts, it is 
natural to imagine something like a picture or a sentence and then to consider how it 
might be carved up, or from what it might have been composed. But this is not a 
helpful way to think about the kind of sub-propositional-sized representations at 
issue. We have already seen that promising accounts of the parts of concepts are 
not to be thought of on this model, but as something less µZRUG-like¶, such as an 
ability. 
Similarly, in the case of intuitions we should think again. The role of intuition is 
not to present anything as being a certain way. Intuitions simply present us, 
immediately, with objects. Indeed, some discussions of intuitions characterize them 
as presenting, rather than representing, objects.10 This can be understood as the 
view that intuitions relate us directly to objects, rather than having an intentional 
content that represents objects. There is scope for a great deal of subtlety and detail 
in developing different such accounts of intuition, and what, if any, role might be 
played by intentional content. My aim here is to focus solely on the mereological 
question: how can thinking of intuitions as presenting help us to understand their 
mereological structure, and thereby to distinguish them from concepts? There are 
myriad other considerations that I will be unable to address here. My aim is not, 
therefore, to present a well-rounded interpretation, but only to contribute to the 
mereological aspect of one. 
I propose, then, to see where we get if we think of an intuition as an instance 
of a relation between a subject and an object: the presentation relation.  
This interpretation offers us a way to understand the singularity and 
immediacy of intuition. First, if an intuition is a relation between a subject and an 
object, then its singularity can consist in the fact that it relates us to a single object: 
µThe idea that intuitions are singular means that there is a particular thing the 
LQWXLWLRQSUHVHQWV¶$OODLV  
One might worry, however, that it seems that we can be presented with 
pluralities in our experience of the world. For example, I might simply be presented 
with some things without them having to be presented to me as a collection or 
whole²I could have an intuition of The Beatles, taken as them, not as a single 
group. There are different ways we might respond to this worry. (1) We might allow 
that a single instance of the presentation relation can hold between a subject and 
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variably many objects: many objects can, in a single stroke, be presented together  
to a subject. 7KLVZRXOGEHWRJLYHXSRQWKHOHWWHURI.DQW¶VYLHZEXWLWZRXOGUHWDLQ
the immediacy of intuition. Moreover, the sense in which intuitions could present 
more than one thing would still be different to the generality of a concept. Concepts 
are general because they represent via marks that things can share; intuitions would 
be plural because a plurality of things are presented, not because they share any 
features. Alternatively, we might retain the principle that one intuition presents one 
single thing. Either (2), in an apparent presentation of plurality, we posit a plurality of 
singular presentations, or (3), we posit a singular presentation of a group, the parts 
or members of which could only be discerned with the application of concepts. For 
example, we could construe a presentation of The Beatles in terms of four distinct 
presentations. Or we could construe it as a single presentation, in which four men 
could be discerned once appropriate concepts are applied. I will not adjudicate 
between these options here. It is enough to note that there is ample scope to 
accommodate plural intuitions if necessary. 
Second, if an intuition is a direct relation between an object and a subject, 
then we can understand the claim that they are immediately related. This is in 
contrast to a case where a subject is related to an object via an intermediary, for 
example, a mental image that is of the object.  
Allais interprets the immediacy claim in terms of GHSHQGHQFHµAs I read 
.DQW¶VLPPHGLDF\FODLPKHWKLQNVWKDWLQWXLWLRQVDUHREMHFW-dependent in the sense 
WKDWZHKDYHDQLQWXLWLRQRIDQREMHFWRQO\ZKHQWKDWREMHFWLVLQIDFWSUHVHQWWRXV¶
(p.156). This object-dependence can be accounted for in terms of the relational view: 
if an intuition is a relation between a subject and an object, then if there is a relatum 
missing, there is no relation. Just as there is no intuition if there is an object but no 
subject present, so there is no intuition if there is a subject but no object. Whether or 
not it is correct to interpret Kant as claiming that intuitions are object-dependent  is a 
matter of some controversy.11 This is also complicated by the fact that there are 
different strengths of dependence. Must an object be present at the same time as 
one intuits it, or just either at the same time or prior to the time of the intuition of it, or 
something even weaker? 
It seems to me that as long as we can make sense of there being something 
presented, some relatum, whether it be concurrent or not, or recombined or 
whatever, then there is scope to think of intuitions as relations. A serious problem 
therefore arises if we want to make sense of misleading intuitions, that is, 
hallucination and illusion. If it seems to me as if I am presented with some object x, 
EXWLWWXUQVRXWWKDW,¶PZURQJKRZFDQZHH[SODLQWKDW" If I have an intuition of x, 
then x must exist, so how can we account for hallucinatory intuitions? 
Again, this is a matter of controversy.12 I thus offer a sketch of a way that 
intuitions, conceived of as relations, can meet this challenge, and leave the details 
IRUHOVHZKHUH,WLVDQLPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHRI.DQW¶Vaccount that there are inner 
intuitions as well as outer intuitions. Outer intuitions are of objects outside us in 
space. Inner intuitions are of our own mental states. One way to account for 
hallucinations is in terms of our mistaking an inner intuition for an outer intuition. For 
Kant, whilst the forms of sensibility are space and time, there is no one sense with 
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both space and time as its forms. Rather, outer sense has the form of space, so that 
outer intuitions are spatial in form, and inner sense has the form of time, so that inner 
intuitions are temporal in form. Our intuitions of the outer world present it as being in 
space and time because outer intuitions²in spatial form²pass through the mind 
and thereby are presented in inner intuition, as with any other mental state, and 
thereby also given temporal form (see A34/B50-1). As at least some outer intuitions 
become objects of inner intuition, it seems thereby plausible that we might (mis)take 
an inner intuition to be presenting a genuine outer intuition when in fact it is 
presenting some other inner state. Ultimately, the important point for present 
purposes is that all intuitions have an object, only in some cases this inner object is 
not an outer intuition, but some other kind of inner state. Hence, there is no bar from 
hallucination to taking intuitions to be relations, and thereby object-dependent. 
I now turn to how thinking of an intuition as a presentation relation helps with 
the mereological question. The following is our target view: An intuition is an instance 
of the presentation relation. The presentation relation is simple: it has no prior parts 
upon which it depends. However, intuitions must be presented to us in a particular 
form ± in space and time. This means that intuitions do have some further structure 
that we can discern, in terms of which we can take an intuition to have parts. But 
these parts are posterior to and dependent on the intuition as a whole. Parts 
existentially depend upon the whole. The nature of those parts may depend to some 
extent on the nature of the whole, but it may also depend upon the mechanisms by 
which we decompose the whole into parts. 
At the core of the proposal is the idea that (an instance of) the presentation 
relation is simple. In some cases, it does make sense to think of a relation as having 
component parts. For example, perhaps the cousin relation is in fact a complex of 
relations of parenthood and siblinghood, and perhaps siblinghood in turn is 
composed out of parenthood relations. The thought is that the presentation relation 
is different. There are no obvious candidates, as in the case of cousinhood, for 
component parts upon which the whole presentation relation depends. It is simply a 
primitive intentional relation between subject and object. 
If intuitions are presentation relations, in what sense could they have parts? 
An answer to this question will require a diversion through the metaphysics of 
properties and relations. In other words, what is a relation and in what sense could 
that kind of entity have parts? 
Let us begin with a traditional option: properties and relations are universals. It 
is distinctive of a universal that the very same ± numerically identical ± universal is 
present in all its instances. So, for example, the very same relation is present in 
-DFN¶VEeing presented with a rockDQG-LOO¶V being presented with a tree. For 
present purposes, we want to allow that there are distinct intuitions, for example, an 
intuition of the rock is distinct from an intuition of the tree. If we take the intuition to 
be just the universal presentation relation in each instance, then given that the 
relation is one and the same universal, the intuitions will turn out to be identical, not 
distinct after all. In order to ensure the distinctness of different intuitions, then, we 
need to consider an intuition to be, not merely a universal, but a relational complex in 
which the universal and its relata are combined. For example, the state of affairs 
combining presentation, Jack, and the rock, is distinct from the state of affairs 
12 
 
combining presentation, Jill, and the tree, in virtue of containing different 
constituents.  
The problem with this view, however, is that it gets the mereology wrong. The 
relational complex is best understood as a whole dependent on its parts, that is, 
dependent on and composed from presentation, subject, and object. But the 
mereological structure of an intuition is supposed to be the other way around. One 
might respond with an account according to which states of affairs are fundamental 
and their parts are abstractions from the whole. For example, Armstrong (1978) 
presents such a view. I will not rehearse all of the criticisms of this view.13 But 
consider: is it plausible to think that either the subject or the object is an abstraction 
from an intuitive state of affairs, dependent in some way on that state of affairs? 
Prima facie, we would, on the contrary, expect things like Jack, Jill, rocks and trees 
to exist independently of states of affairs in which they are presented to, or 
presented.  
Nominalist alternatives to universals give an account of properties and 
relations in terms of some other kind of entity, for example, sets or classes. It is 
standard to take the semantic value of a relational predicate to be a set of ordered 
tuples ± for example, the semantic value of µis a sister of¶ is the set of pairs of sisters. 
Can we take the presentation relation to be the set of ordered pairs of subject and 
presented object, and an instance of the relation ± an intuition ± to be a member of 
the set (i.e., one of these ordered pairs)? No. If an intuition is a set, then its 
mereological structure will be that of a set. But I have already discussed above that 
this has the structure of the parts (members) being prior to the whole (set). So this 
account would yield the wrong mereological result. 
 The best prospect for giving metaphysical support to the target view is to 
think of an intuition as a presentation relation trope. Tropes are qualitative and 
particular. One can think of a trope as being like an instance of a property or relation, 
but where it is a genuinely particular thing (this redness, that presenting). 
Importantly, different instances of µthe same¶ relation are numerically distinct tropes. 
Such tropes do not have their bearers or relata as parts, rather, if anything, they are 
understood to themselves be parts of those bearers. For example, sometimes tropes 
are introduced as abstract parts: just as we can think of a rose as having concrete 
parts²its stem, petals and thorns²we can think of it as having abstract parts²its 
colour and scent. One might plausibly take the existence and/or the identity of a 
trope to be dependent on its bearer(s): foUH[DPSOHWKHURVH¶VUHGQHVVPD\GHSHQG
for its existence upon the rose ± if there was no rose, there would not be its redness 
± DQGWKLVWURSHLVWKHLQGLYLGXDOLWLVUDWKHUWKDQWKHUHGQHVVRI5XGROSK¶VQRVHLQ
virtue of being a part of the rose rather than Rudolph. This may suggest, although I 
will not explore this further here, that at least some tropes are dependent parts of a 
whole, but it does not suggest that they themselves have parts, let alone parts upon 
which they depend.14  
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These features mean that appeal to a presentation trope ensures the 
distinctness of different intuitions, without requiring the relata to be parts of the 
intuition (unlike the relational complex view). There are presentations (of objects to 
subjects), just as there are rednesses (of roses). Even if we take an intuition to be 
individuated by, or have its identity determined by, its relata (a particular intuition is 
the presentation of Jack to Jill, say, rather than the presentation of Bill to Ben), this 
would not mean that its relata are thereby its parts. (Compare: we might identify 
Mary as the first daughter of Henry, but this does not mean that Henry is a part of 
Mary.) In general, tropes are thought of as simple entities, i.e., they have no prior 
parts. Hence, presentation tropes promise to yield the right mereology.  
If we take intuitions to be presentation relations tropes holding between 
subjects and objects, we can explain why the parts of intuitions are not prior to the 
whole: tropes are simple. The next question is to consider how such a thing could 
have parts at all. To properly capture the mereological claims made by Kant, we 
need to understand how an intuition can have parts that are posterior to it.  
What allows us to discern parts in an otherwise simple intuition? I suggest:  
temporal and spatial form. Kant argues that our representations of space and time 
are intuitions. But he also argues that they are pure, that is, not derived from sense 
experience. However, if they are not presented to us via the senses, how can they 
be intuited? Kant answers: they are forms of intuition. Kant writes in the 
Prolegomena 
How is it possible to intuit something a priori? An intuition is a representation 
[eine Vorstellung] of the sort which would depend immediately on the 
presence of an object. It therefore seems impossible originally to intuit a priori, 
since then the intuition would have to occur without an object being present, 
either previously or now, to which it could refer, and so it could not be an 
intuition.  (4:281-2) 
There is therefore only one way possible for my intuition to precede the 
actuality of the object and occur as an a priori cognition, namely if it contains 
nothing else except the form of sensibility«(4:282) 
The result is that particulars are presented to us (intuited) as being in space and 
time. Space and time are the forms of intuitions. But how should we understand this? 
Are they the forms of the intuitions themselves, or of what is intuited? 
 The latter route seems plausible: what Kant means is that objects are 
presented to us ± intuited ± as being in space and time. How could this provide us 
with an account of the mereological structure of the intuition itself ± our target 
question? It would require us to revive an earlier option: representations have the 
mereological structure they represent things as having. My primary concern with this 
was that it would blur the distinction between concepts and intuitions, as concepts 
can plausibly represent things as µSULRUwholes¶too. However, we now have the 
resources to respond to this worry. If intuitions are, at bottom, simple tropes, then 
representing things as having parts is the only sense in which intuitions could be 
thought to have parts. Indeed, Kant writes 
Every intuition contains a manifold in itself, which however would not be 
represented as such if the mind did not distinguish the time in the succession 
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of impressions on one another; for as contained in one moment no 
representation can ever be anything other than absolute unity. (A99) 
This suggests that Kant himself takes intuitions to be primarily simple, and that they 
only have parts insofar as they represent a temporal structure. Crucially, concepts 
are different because there are other ways that they can have parts. A concept 
understood as an ability, or a set, say, already has a mereological structure that 
does not depend upon the structure it represents things as having.  
 Still, there is a second option: to take space and time as the forms of the 
intuitions themselves. It seems reasonable to suppose that at least some tropes are 
temporally and/or spatially extended. The redness of the rose covers the space filled 
by its petals, and it endures throughout the life of the flower. Similarly, we might think 
that a presentation trope extends between subject and object and, perhaps more 
plausibly, that it extends throughout the time of the presenting. If the thought is that 
intuitions extend over time, and hence they that at least have temporal parts, one 
might worry again that the distinction between concepts and intuitions would be 
blurred. It seems reasonable to suppose that on at least some understandings of a 
concept, a concept is also temporally extended (e.g., an ability may persist over 
time). To this, we can make the same form of response as above. Intuitions can only 
have parts insofar as they are temporally extended. Concepts are different because 
there are other ways that they can have parts. A concept understood as an ability, or 
a set, say, already has a mereological structure that does not depend upon any 
spatial or temporal extension it may also have.  
 These responses ± appealing to the claim that concepts have parts in another 
sense ± raise a further, important, question. Does the view require that all concepts 
have parts? If not, then the mereological structures of concepts would bottom out in 
some basic, simple concepts. However, this would again blur the mereological 
distinction between intuition and concept: we would be faced with a class of 
concepts that ± like intuitions ± are primarily simple. If so, then the parthood relation 
between concepts will either form an infinite hierarchy or a circle. I.e., either we have 
conceptual parts all the way down, or at some point a non-linear network of concepts 
and their parts will be formed. The former view seems highly implausible ± that our 
concepts effectively have an infinite number of more and more basic parts.15 There is 
some plausibility in the latter view. One might think, for example, that we could 
understand our conceptual scheme in terms of a network of abilities, where all such 
abilities could be understood to depend upon other abilities, but where sometimes 
that dependence is mutual, either directly, or at some considerable remove. To 
develop this view, one would have to give up the general principle that all parthood 
relations are a partial ordering (i.e. reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.) If one 
were not willing to give up the principle, this would suggest that this relation amongst 
concepts is not a genuine parthood relation. I leave this for further discussion 
elsewhere.  
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  In short, spatial and temporal form ± in one way or another ± promise 
to give us the resources from which to carve out the parts of intuitions.16 This 
proposal depends heavily on the Kantian claim that the forms of intuition are space 
and time, and so also depends on the success or not of the arguments for those 
claims. I do not have room to assess these claims and arguments here. Rather, I will 
comment on one potential objection, which is internal to the issues discussed in this 
paper. Above, I considered an argument for the conclusion that our representation of 
space is an intuition, which rested on mereological premises. It was the similarity of 
the mereological structure of intuitions in general, and that of our representation of 
space, that was supposed to show that the latter is an intuition. If that argument is to 
avoid begging the question, it cannot already be assumed that the mereological 
structure of intuitions is spatial. But now I have suggested that we should understand 
the mereological structure of intuitions in terms of spatiotemporal structure.  
In response: although I am making appeal to the structure of space and time 
here, this is not what explains that the whole of an intuition is prior to its parts ± the 
crucial mereological feature exploited by the argument. The explanation of the 
priority of the whole intuition did not make any appeal to spatiotemporal structure: 
that relied on the simple nature of presentation. The arguments for representations 
of space and time can then proceed: they are essentially one, with no component 
parts, and so they are intuitions and not concepts. But they are a priori, and so forms 
of intuition, not objects presented to us in intuition. We can then draw on this result to 
go back and see how parts of those simple intuitions could be discerned, exploiting 
this spatiotemporal structure. 
VI. Conclusion. In what sense can a representation have parts? More particularly, 
how can we make sense of sub-propositional-sized mental representations having a 
part-whole structure? I have attempted to provide an answer that is compatible with, 
DQGFRXOGEHXVHGWRVXSSRUW.DQW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQbetween intuitions and concepts. My 
focus has been on intuition, although I have indicated some promising ways to make 
sense of the part-whole structure of concepts. I propose that if we take an intuition to 
be a relational trope, then we can not only make sense of the more familiar aspects 
RI.DQW¶VDFFRXQWRILQWXLWLRQs²that they are singular and immediate²but we can 
also make sense of the mereological features attributed to intuitions without resorting 
to metaphor. A presentation relation trope is simple, and so has no prior parts from 
which it is composed, although the forms of intuition²space and time²provide us 
with resources to carve up intuitions into parts that depend upon the whole. More 
generally, I hope to have shown some of the complexities that arise when we take 
mereological claims about representations seriously, and some options for how we 
can provide metaphysical support for those claims.17  
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